Critical Crypto Flaw: Nonce-Reuse Fix Incomplete in Production Handshake, WebSocket Encryption Still Vulnerable

A critical security fix for a nonce-reuse vulnerability in a WebSocket encryption system has been left incomplete, leaving production code paths exposed. The vulnerability, which could compromise the security of real-time communications, was identified during a review of a previous pull request. While the cryptographic functions to address the flaw were created, they were never integrated into the live handshake process, rendering the intended security patch ineffective.

The core issue is that three separate code locations responsible for establishing encrypted WebSocket connections continue to use a raw, unprocessed Diffie-Hellman shared key. This key is directly assigned to the encryption state without first being passed through the newly created `deriveConnectionKey()` function alongside a generated salt. The vulnerable sites are in the server (`ws-auth.js`), the main application (`message-handler.ts`), and the dashboard (`message-handler.ts`). Each location initializes its encryption state with the raw `sharedKey`, bypassing the crucial key derivation step designed to prevent nonce reuse.

This oversight means the security vulnerability described in the original issue remains open in all operational environments. The failure to wire the new cryptographic primitives into the active handshake logic creates a direct disconnect between the security patch's intent and its implementation. Until these three specific code lines are updated to call `deriveConnectionKey(sharedKey, salt)` and use its output, the system's WebSocket encryption remains at risk of the nonce-reuse attack it was meant to prevent.